After the attacks of 11 September 2001, when nearly 3,000 Americans died in a single day, the United States did not treat the men who planned it like someone caught stealing kapenta at a market.

 

Those were not ordinary crimes—they were acts of war: trained men, coordinated cells, months of planning, and a public claim of credit. They had turned civilian aircraft into weapons, killing innocent people who were working at their desks.

When America moved against them, it did not use traffic police and magistrate courts. It used intelligence-led operations, cross-border interceptions, and high-security military detention in facilities like Guantanamo, deliberately placed outside the ordinary legal system.

The interrogation techniques used there were hard, and America knew the world would say so.

Critics called it abduction. They said detainees were denied lawyers, denied courts, and the ordinary protections of the law. I was a first-year student at an American university in 2002, when that debate was live.

 

I took the position then that I take now: the critics were wrong to treat it as scandal. National security is not negotiable, because it is the ground on which every other right stands. A state that cannot protect millions cannot protect anyone.

Ask yourself the question the critics never answer. A man has helped kill thousands of your people. He knows where the next attack cell is, who funds it, and what is being planned.

Do you hand him a lawyer and a trial date and hope he cooperates? Or do you hold him where he cannot reach his network, and use every lawful means to get the information that stops it?

“You do not protect national security with an arrest warrant. You protect it with intelligence, with special operations, and with detention that keeps dangerous men out of reach while the threat is dismantled.”

You do not protect national security with an arrest warrant. You protect it with intelligence, with special operations, and with detention that keeps dangerous men out of reach while the threat is dismantled.

Every sovereign state recognises the distinction between a street crime and a threat to the state itself, because the graver the threat, the more ordinary procedure must give way to the extraordinary.

 

That is not a loophole in the law; it is why the law separates a market theft from high crimes in the first place. The Bush government would not apologise for preventing the next attack. It had just watched nearly 3,000 die on a quiet September morning. What America did after that morning was not tyranny.

 

It was a state weighing two bad options and choosing the one that did not end with thousands more of its citizens dead.

The Zambian Question More than two decades later, the same charge is now being laid at the doorstep of the Zambian government. The vocabulary has not changed—abduction, disappearance, tyranny—nor has my answer.

 

I defended the American decision then because the threat was specific, the violent network was real, and waiting was not an option. I defend the Zambian government’s position today for the same reasons.

When the state picks up suspects in intelligence-led operations, the first cry is “abduction.” Families say their people were “bundled into vehicles.” Opposition figures say they were “taken” without lawyers. Human rights groups reach for the vocabulary of enforced disappearance.

But look at what the state is actually confronting. It is not about a stolen phone or a market dispute.

Emmanuel “JJ” Banda escaped lawful custody at Chipata General Hospital in August 2024 while awaiting trial for attempted murder and aggravated robbery. You can argue about those charges—his supporters do.

 

What cannot be argued is that he left custody, and stayed gone for more than two years, until he was picked up in Mozambique on 14 October 2026 and brought back to Zambia. He now faces attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and escape from lawful custody.

We have all heard the broadcasts calling for President Hakainde Hichilema to be killed and for members of his ethnic community to be eliminated. You can argue about the videos, but the words are on the record. A call for a president to be killed is not political criticism.

Neither is a call for an ethnic community to be eliminated. Those are grave threats, and they deserve to be treated as threats.

 

A state that waits until a threat becomes an attack has already failed the people it exists to protect. Prevention is not an excuse for action; it is the reason action is taken before the damage is done. And what is being threatened, when a president is marked for death, is not one man. It is the seat from which the security forces are commanded.

We have watched what happens when a president is assassinated and that seat is left vacant.

On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down over Kigali. Within an hour, extremist militia set up roadblocks and began the slaughter of ordinary civilians. The president was dead, and with him went the one voice the security forces were sworn to obey.

 

What filled the vacuum was not a successor. It was whoever was closest to the guns. Within a hundred days, an estimated 800,000 people were dead.

Zambia is not Rwanda, and no serious person is predicting genocide here tomorrow. ButRwanda is the clearest demonstration of what happens when a country’s chain of command breaks. It shows what a presidency is: a switch that, once flipped, can plunge a nation into darkness. In 1994, the target was never one man.

 

It was the chain that commands the guns, the soldiers who carry them, the officers who keep law and order—and the millions of people who live in peace because that chain holds.

That is what is at stake when a man broadcasts a call for a president to be killed. He is not asking for a change of government. He is asking for that chain to be broken. And the people who would fall are not politicians.

 

They are the 21.9 million Zambians who wake up expecting the police to answer when called, the army to stay in its barracks, and the courts to open the next morning. None of that is automatic—it all runs through one desk in the Office of the President.

“These operations protect you: the ordinary Zambian with no security standing at the gate. You will sleep peacefully tonight because someone moved before a threat became an attack.”

This is what those special operations protect. Not the people in power—they have their own bodyguards and their own high walls. They will sleep soundly whether a single suspect is picked up or not.

These operations protect you: the ordinary Zambian with no security standing at the gate. You will sleep peacefully tonight because someone moved before a threat became an attack. And the people who need the state most are usually the last to know it acted.

A man who steals kapenta at Soweto market is arrested by an officer in uniform, taken to Central Police Station, and brought before a magistrate. That is ordinary justice, and it should look ordinary.

A man who broadcasts a call for the President’s assassination is not the kapenta thief. This man has aimed at the seat from which the police, the army and the intelligence services are commanded. You do not answer a threat of that kind with a summons delivered to an address he abandoned two years ago.

You answer it with intelligence, with border interception, with cooperation from a neighbouring government—and with custody that ends up in front of a judge, not in a place no lawyer can reach.

The point of the operation is to get the suspect before that judge. If the case then takes time, he waits in custody where he can be found—not somewhere no one can reach him.

When America held the men who planned September 11 outside the ordinary legal system, the critics called it abduction. When states deploy covert intelligence and cross-border operations to neutralise threats before blood is spilled, as Zambia has done, critics reach for the words “abduction” and “tyranny.” They are wrong. Abduction is lawless kidnapping without state mandate or a court at the end of it.

And the court is not a bystander in this case. When Banda’s mother filed for habeas corpus, the High Court did not just accept the State’s claim that he was too ill to appear. The judge went directly to Maina Soko hospital and found a man recovering from major orthopedic surgery. That is not what happens in a disappearance. A disappeared person has no case number and no judge. And it is certainly not tyranny, where people vanish without a trace.

Here, the High Court physically went to the hospital bed to verify the State’s story—the judiciary holding a state accountable.

A special operation is targeted, intelligence-driven interception designed to bring dangerous fugitives and instigators back under the authority of the law. That is not a definition the critics can argue with. It is one they can only ignore.

Ask them anyway. Suppose Zambia had waited until a prosecutor was ready. Suppose a president had then been killed, and the chain of command had broken as it did in Kigali in 1994. Who among them would have accepted the excuse that the case was not yet complete?

Not one. They would have been the first to demand why the state did not act. But act, and you call the President a tyrant. Wait, and you call him negligent. So let them say plainly which one they would have chosen—and tell us who they would have blamed if they chose wrong.