The surge of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in protected areas, particularly Game Management Areas (GMAs) surrounding Luangwa and Kafue landscapes presents a serious challenge to Zambia’s environmental integrity. Yet, this crisis also presents an opportunity for transformative change in governance. Building on the risks identified in the previous opinion such as habitat loss, pollution, and funding flight, Zambia must pivot toward a decisive, multifaceted strategy. The goal is to harmonise extractive livelihoods with conservation imperatives through integrated policy, institutional coordination, and innovative finance.
Central towards the solution is acknowledging that ASM is not a marginal activity to mineral-endowed rural areas but the main economic feature. For many households around Luangwa and Kafue landscapes, mining is primary or secondary source of income, often alongside agriculture, fishing, or tourism. Hence, any policy centred on solely to ban or displace ASM is destined for failure as such approaches are politically fragile and socially unjust. Instead, the goal should be to enhance formalization coupled with effective enforcement. By bringing the ASM into the formal economy, government can impose environmental and social safeguards and locate mining activities in ways that do not undermine conservation or climate finance.
The key lever for sustainable existence of ASM in protected areas is rigorous land use planning. Currently, many GMAs operate without or updated Game Management Plans (GMPs), leaving them vulnerable to unregulated encroachment. There is an urgent need for participatory zoning that explicitly designates no-go zones, restricted, and permitted mining areas. Developing these maps requires an inclusive process involving the Ministry of Mines, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), local councils, traditional leaders, and ASM associations. Crucially, these zoning maps should be legally linked to the mining licensing system so that permits cannot be issued in prohibited areas. When the map is the law, the ambiguity that currently allows license-slipping evaporates.
ASM formalisation is more than just registration, it is about strengthening their capacity to operate as environmental stewards. This includes streamlining the licensing process to make legal compliance easier than illegal operation. This can be actualized, for example, through the development of conservation-compatible permits or licensing system that require miners to adopt good practices, such as mercury-free gold recovery.
Supporting communitybased ASM cooperatives is a promising model. Cooperatives are easier to regulate and monitor than scattered individuals, and they are more likely to reinvest benefits locally. Drawing inspiration from Ghana’s Galamsey reforms, Zambia can channel mining royalties back into community development plans, ensuring that the wealth generated from the land supports the communities tasked with protecting it.
Presently, responsibilities for land, mining, wildlife, and climate related projects are spread across multiple government institutions. The Ministry of Mines often operates independently of the DWNP, leading to situations where mining licenses are granted in areas that wildlife authorities are trying to protect. This fragmentation creates cracks that unregulated miners are quick to exploit. Thus, the mining licensing committee must be restructured to include permanent, legally recognized representation from the DWNP and climate agencies. Decisions regarding mining in protected areas should not be made on an ad hoc basis but through a formal, inter-ministerial mechanism. This coordination is particularly critical for projects funded by climate finance, which often span multiple sectors and require high levels of transparency and environmental integrity.
Financewise, there is room to design targeted incentive mechanisms that align ASM and conservation interests. For example, cooperatives can be offered preferential access to certain areas in exchange for committing to nomining zones in sensitive habitats, or for contributing to local conservation funds. Similarly, NbS and climatefinance projects should incorporate integrate landuse management components. These funds could support early warning systems and community patrols that help miners and conservationists work together to detect illegal incursions. The idea is not to pay miners to stop mining, but to pay them to mine in ways that are compatible with conservation.
In Luangwa and Kafue landscapes, communities often value of wildlife, but ASM offers immediate cash that frequently outweigh long-term, often abstracts benefits of conservation. So, climate finance needs to deliver visible, near-term benefits such as improved water access, schools, and community infrastructure. Simultaneously, empowering communities through diversified, wildlife-friendly livelihoods such as agroforestry and value-added crafts are critical to address ASM’s poverty pull. When a community has a diversified economic portfolio, they are more likely to resist illegal incursions that threaten their long-term environmental security.
The ASM surge in protected areas is a test of Zambia’s governance, innovation, and political will. If managed with foresight, ASM can transition from a threat into a partner for rural development and ecological restoration. This could eventually lead to a mining for restoration narrative, where miners are incentivized to rehabilitate disturbed lands, turning degraded pits into reforested carbon sinks. Ignoring or mishandling the ASM phenomenon risk turning Zambia’s iconic landscapes into battlegrounds where conservation and climate finance lose by default. By choosing the path of targeted, inclusive solutions, Zambia can safeguard its natural heritage while ensuring that its rural citizens are not left behind in the transition to a green economy.
Author
Solomon Mwampikita is a Natural Resources Management Expert, currently serving as the Lead Researcher on Climate Change and Environment at the Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD).
