Part One argued that installed electricity capacity is not the same as dependable, deliverable power. Part Two examines what must work between a generator and an eligible buyer before electricity can arrive reliably.
Zambia has moved in the right direction. The Electricity Open Access Regulations were enacted in 2024, the framework was launched in February 2025, final operating procedures have been published and several transmission investments are planned or under development. The task is now implementation: whether users can identify usable network capacity, obtain neutral access, settle imbalances and understand the full cost of delivery.
Figure: Elements of power deliverability. Framework informed by Zambia’s Electricity Open Access Regulations and final System Operator Guidelines.
Capacity must be visible before it can be allocated
Open Access does not create transmission headroom; it governs capacity that exists. The 2024 Regulations require congestion assessment, while the final System Operator Guidelines require annual and monthly reports on total, allocated and available spare transmission capacity.
The question is whether this information is timely and usable. The System Operator should publish the required reports through the Open Access Management System and make aggregate versions accessible to prospective applicants, with sufficient corridor- and node-level detail. ERB should report performance against the prescribed 30-day network decision and subsequent five-day System Operator decision, together with application queues and congestion or curtailment events. Commercially sensitive details can remain protected.
System operation must be neutral
Open Access requires an operator that allocates capacity, schedules power, manages curtailment and settles imbalances impartially. The final Guidelines place the Market Operator Unit within the System Operator as a ring-fenced unit. Yet the published Open Access Implementation Road Map set 25 July 2025 for establishing an Independent System and Market Operator, which ZESCO describes as critical to operationalising the new market.
The Ministry of Energy and ERB should publish the ISMO’s current status, mandate, governance safeguards, staffing, system-data access and timetable for transferring functions. A phased transition may be practical, but it needs measurable milestones. Neutral operation strengthens confidence that dispatch and access follow known rules.
A contract still has to survive real time
A PPA or supply agreement promises electricity over a contractual period; the grid must remain balanced continuously. Solar output changes, plants trip, customers deviate from nominations, and transmission equipment becomes unavailable. Metering, day-ahead scheduling, balancing, financial security and settlement are therefore the machinery that converts a contract into delivered electricity.
The framework already requires metering audits, monthly reconciliation, outage reporting and compliance reports. ERB should publish whether these duties are completed on time, with aggregate curtailment and dispute data. The instruments also need harmonisation: the Balancing Mechanism allows five business days to challenge monthly reconciliation, while the Balancing Agreement allows two; the Guidelines specify both seven and 14 days for detailed incident reports. Timely, consistent execution shows a functioning market.
Transmission investment must follow credible demand
ZESCO’s pipeline identifies the geography of the challenge. The Central Corridor reinforcement is intended to increase transfer capacity towards the Copperbelt, North-Western mining loads, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Zambia–Tanzania–Kenya corridor. Pensulo–Mansa is intended to support future mining and agricultural demand in Luapula, while the Zambia–Malawi interconnector is expected to expand regional trade.
For the three-million-tonne copper ambition, the ministries responsible for energy and mining should work with network operators to link credible mining and processing projects to expected demand, location, commissioning dates, substations, required upgrades, financing and construction milestones. Otherwise, mining, generation and transmission plans may each appear plausible while remaining inconsistent in place and time.
Delivery costs must be allocated fairly
Open Access can mobilise private supply and reduce ZESCO’s burden of financing new generation. However, if customer migration leaves efficiently incurred legacy contractual obligations, their allocation must be transparent. Excessive or opaque network charges present the opposite danger by blocking entry and protecting inefficiency.
The System Operator Guidelines apply cost causation: beneficiaries, including the applicant, bear upgrade costs unless all current and future users benefit, when costs are socialised. ERB should keep approved charge schedules accessible and report how loss factors used in settlement and this rule are applied. ERB and the Public Service Trader should explain in aggregate whether migration leaves efficiently incurred legacy obligations and how any recovery is allocated. This would help investors price delivery, test consistent treatment and protect other customers from unjustified transfers.
ERB should use existing information from the System Operator, network operators and Public Service Trader to publish a concise quarterly Open Access performance summary. It should track capacity requested, approved and connected; performance against application and connection deadlines; congestion, curtailment and settlement. This is not another reporting layer, but a public test of where transactions stall and whether access is timely and non-discriminatory. Part One concluded that power on paper cannot run a mine. Part Two shows that Open Access on paper cannot do so either.
About the Author. Ibrahim Kamara is Head of Research at the Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD). He holds degrees in Economics and Finance and a Master’s in Public Finance and Taxation from the University of Lusaka. He is currently pursuing a second master’s degree in Economics at the Copperbelt University. His work focuses on applied economic research for policy reform, supported by experience in financial journalism an
d public policy analysis.
