Part One: The Policy Choices Facing Zambia’s Maize Market
This week’s Monday Opinion examines the policy choices confronting Government as the 2025/2026 maize marketing season begins. The Food Reserve Agency’s (FRA) decision to delay announcing the maize purchase price until grain moisture levels improve has generated public uncertainty among stakeholders, particularly farmers who expected the price to be announced following the president’s indication that FRA would soon communicate it during a rally in Kanchibiye District. However, these questions overlook a more fundamental policy issue: how government should balance farmer welfare, institutional viability and capturing rural allegiance in a marketing season characterized by an exceptional maize bumper harvest, infrastructure constraints and climate uncertainties.
More Than a Price Announcement
Public opinion often assumes that FRA determines the market price of maize. In practice, FRA is one of several buyers in the market alongside millers, grain traders and other private sector participants. Although the Agency has consistently clarified that it offers a procurement price rather than setting the market price, its announcement remains an important market signal because many farmers use it as a benchmark when deciding where and when to sell their maize.
FRA’s explanation that high grain moisture levels have delayed the price announcement highlights an immediate operational challenge. Procuring maize before it reaches acceptable moisture standards increases storage losses, drying costs and the risk of grain deterioration. Waiting is therefore not only a technical decision but also a prudent measure to protect the Strategic Food Reserve. Yet grain quality is only part of the challenge.
A Surplus Economy Meets Structural Constraints
The 2025/2026 maize marketing season presents Zambia with an unusual policy challenge as several market fundamentals have converged. Zambia has recorded a bumper maize harvest of approximately 4.9 million metric tonnes, the highest on record, alongside an estimated 1.5 million metric tonnes of carry-over stocks from the previous season. Together, these stocks place maize availability well above the country’s annual consumption requirement of about 3.8 million metric tonnes for both human and animal consumption.
Ordinarily, such a surplus would strengthen food security and create opportunities for regional exports. However, it also creates excess domestic supply, placing downward pressure on producer prices. Under normal market conditions, lower prices would encourage millers, traders and exporters to absorb part of the surplus. Where private demand is insufficient, however, pressure inevitably shifts to Government to intervene through FRA.
This is where FRA plays a strategic role. During periods when there is over production, when domestic maize supply outweighs market demand, producer prices face downwards pressure. Government must then decide whether FRA should intervene by purchasing part of the surplus to support farmer incomes or allow markets forces to determine prices. However, this intervention would require government to substantially procure large volumes, which would increase expenditure on maize purchases, transportation, drying, and storage, placing pressure on public finances.
Balancing Markets and Public Policy
The central policy dilemma is therefore not whether to announce a maize purchase price, but how to balance competing objectives. Allowing market forces to determine prices would likely lower producer prices because of the large surplus. This would reduce Government’s fiscal burden and encourage the private sector and millers to purchase the surplus maize from farmers. However, where private demand is insufficient to absorb the surplus, prolonged price decline could increase pressure on government to intervene through FRA to support market stability. As Zambia approaches the 2026 general elections, these concerns become even more politically sensitive given agriculture’s importance to rural livelihoods.
Conversely, announcing a relatively high FRA floor price would support farmer income and provide market confidence. However, it would require significantly higher public expenditure, increasing pressure on storage infrastructure and potentially discouraging private buyers from participating competitively in the market.
Looking Beyond the Current Harvest
Climate uncertainty further reinforces the importance of effective reserve management. With forecasts pointing to the possibility of El Niño-related conditions in the next agricultural season, maintaining adequate strategic grain reserves remains a critical element of national food security. The question is therefore not only how much maize Zambia has produced, but whether the country has the institutional capacity and infrastructure to preserve that surplus for future periods of need.
Moving The Conversation Forward
The 2025/2026 marketing season has exposed a broader structural challenge. Zambia has produced more maize than the domestic market consumes, yet fiscal constraints, limited storage and climate uncertainty limit Government’s ability to purchase and store the surplus. The resulting policy dilemma is not simply about setting a price. It is about defining the complementary role of FRA and the private sector, safeguarding farmer welfare without undermining fiscal sustainability and strengthening the infrastructure needed to secure food security.
Look out for Part Two next week, where we examine policy options that Government and other stakeholders must adopt to strengthen Zambia’s maize marketing season.
About the Author. Barnabas Mwale is an International Trade and Investment Specialist. He holds a degree in Economics and Finance from the University of Lusaka and is currently pursuing a master’s degree in international Trade and Policy at ZCAS University.




