Is Lungu Eligible to Stand for a Third Term? Written Arguments by John Sangwa SC filed in the Constitutional Court on behalf of Sishuwa Sishuwa and Chapter One Foundation

MAY it Please the Court.
[1] These are the arguments on behalf of the Petitioners in support of the Petition. In the first part we sum up the Petitioners’ case. In the second part we address the law, and in the last part we apply to the law to the facts. In these arguments we shall refer to the Constitution of 1991, as amended in 1996 but before the amendment of 5th January 2016, as (CBA) and the Constitution of 1991, as amended in 1996 and 2016 as CAA.
Facts Not In Dispute
[2] Based on the Petition and the Answers to the Petition and the Reply to the Answers, there are certain facts that are not in dispute. Based on what has been stated in the Petition the Constitution that is in force in Zambia is that of 1991, as amended in 1996 and 2016 and since it came into effect on 24th August 1991, a general election has been held every five years.
[3] On 20th September 2011 a general election was held and the Respondent contested the election as the parliamentary candidate for Chawama Constituency sponsored by the Patriotic Front (PF) Party founded by Mr Michael Sata in 2001. Mr Sata was the Presidential candidate sponsored by the PF. Mr Sata won the election and was sworn into the office of President on 23rd September 2011. The Respondent was elected Member of the National Assembly representing Chawama Constituency, in the Lusaka Province. President Sata appointed the Respondent to his Cabinet.
[4] On 28th October 2014, a vacancy occurred in the office of President following the demise of President Michael Sata. Until its amendment in 2016, the Constitution of Zambia did not provide for automatic assumption or ascension by the Vice-President to the office of President in the event of a vacancy.
[5] In the event of a vacancy in the office of President an election had to be held within ninety days from the date of the office becoming vacant and until the election was held and a person elected President assumed the office of President, the Vice-President performed the functions of the office of President. The Respondent was not the Vice-President of the Republic of Zambia when the office of President became vacant on 28th October 2014. On 20th January 2015, a presidential election was held pursuant to Article 38(1) of the CBA to fill the vacancy created by the demise of President Sata.
The First Election of the Respondent
[6] The Respondent who was a Member of the National Assembly was sponsored by the PF as its presidential candidate for the election set for 20th January 2015. The election was contested by candidates sponsored by other political parties. The election to the office of President was governed by Article 34 of the CBA, which read:
34. [Election of President]
(1) The election of the President shall be direct by universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot and shall be conducted in accordance with this Article and as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(2) An election to the office of President shall be held whenever the National Assembly is dissolved and otherwise as provided by Article 38.
(3) A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as President if —
(a) he is a citizen of Zambia;
(b) both his parents are Zambians by birth or descent;
(c) he has attained the age of thirty-five years;
(d) he is a member of, or is sponsored by, a political party;
(e) he is qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly; and
(f) he has been domiciled in Zambia for a period of at least twenty years.
(4) A candidate for election as President (hereinafter referred to as a Presidential candidate) shall deliver his nomination papers to the returning officer in such manner, on such day, at such time and at such place as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
(5) A Presidential candidate shall not be entitled to take part in an election unless —
(a) he has paid such election fee as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament on or before the date fixed by the Electoral Commission in that behalf;
(b) he makes, a statutory declaration, of his assets and liabilities, which shall be open to public inspection at such time and at such place as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament; and
(c) his nomination is supported by not less than 200 registered voters.
(6) At an election to the office of President —
(a) all persons registered in Zambia as voters for the purposes of elections to the National Assembly shall be entitled to vote in the election;
(b) the poll shall be taken by a secret ballot on such day, at such time, in such places and in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament;
(c) after the expiration of the time fixed for polling, the votes cast shall be counted and the returning officer shall declare the result.
(7) Where there is only one qualified Presidential candidate nominated for election, that candidate shall be declared as elected without an election taking place.
(8) The Returning Officer shall declare the candidate who receives the highest numbers of the total votes cast to have been duly elected as President.
(9) A person elected as President under this Article shall be sworn in and assume office immediately but not later than twenty-four hours from the time of declaring the election.
(10) The person who has held office of President shall immediately hand over the office of President to the person elected as President and shall complete the procedural and administrative handing over process within fourteen days from the date the person elected as President is sworn in.
(11) The person who has held office as President shall not, within the period referred to in clause (10), perform any functions of the office of President under this Constitution or any other law. (Emphasis ours)
[7] The Respondent was declared winner of the election because he received the highest number of the votes cast. Article 34(9) of the CBA required the winning presidential candidate to be sworn and assume the office of President not later than twenty-four hours from the date of the declaration of the election results. Furthermore, before assuming the office of President, Article 40 of the CBA required the winning candidate to take oath and subscribe to such other oaths as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament. The Respondent was sworn into and assumed the office of President on 25th January 2015.
The First Tenure of the Respondent as President
[8] The assumption of the office of President by the Respondent was subject to Article 35 of the CBA, which addressed the tenure of the office of President. It read:
35. [Tenure of office of President]
(1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five years.
(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution or any other Law no person who has twice been elected as President shall be eligible for re-election to that office.
(3) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker of the National Assembly, resign his office.
(4) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution shall, unless —
(a) he resigns his office;
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37; or
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved; continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President assumes office. (Emphasis ours)

[9] The evidence before Court shows that Article 35 of CBA was introduced in 1996 by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1996. Before that the tenure of the office of President was governed by Article 35 of the Constitution of 1991.
[10] Before the election of the Respondent on 20th January 2015, the last general election was held on 20th September 2011. It followed that the next election was to be no later than 19th September 2016.
Amendment of the Constitution in 2016
[11] The CBA was amended on 5th January 2016. Article 56(1) of the CAA provides when a general election is to be held. It reads:
56. (1) A general election shall be held, every five years after the last general election, on the second Thursday of August.

[12] In line with Article 56(1) of the CAA, the next election after the general election of 20th September 2011 was scheduled for 11th August 2016.

The Second Election of The Respondent
[13] Having been elected on 20th January 2015, the Respondent therefore held the office of President for the first time from 25th January 2015 to 13th September 2016. He was sponsored for the second time by the PF as its presidential candidate for the general election scheduled for 11th August 2016. The said election was held pursuant to the provisions of the CAA. The First Respondent met the qualifications contained in Article 100(1) of the CAA, which read:
100. (1) A person qualifies to be nominated as a candidate for election as President if that person —
(a) is a citizen by birth or descent;
(b) has been ordinarily resident in Zambia;
(c) is at least thirty-five years old;
(d) is a registered voter;
(e) has obtained, as a minimum academic qualification, a grade twelve certificate or its equivalent;
(f) is fluent in the official language;
(g) has paid that person’s taxes or has made arrangements, satisfactory to the appropriate tax authority, for the payment of the taxes;
(h) declares that person’s assets and liabilities, as prescribed;
(i) pays the prescribed election fee on, or before, the date fixed for the delivery of nomination papers; and
(j) is supported by at least one hundred registered voters from each Province.

[14] The disqualifications contained in Article 100 (2) of the CAA did not apply to the Respondent and they read:
(2) A person is disqualified from being nominated as a candidate for election as President if that person —
(a) is a public officer;
(b) has dual citizenship;
(c) is holding or acting in a Constitutional office or other public office;
(d) is a judge or judicial officer;
(e) was removed from public office on grounds of gross misconduct in the immediate preceding five years;
(f) has a mental or physical disability that would make the person incapable of performing the executive functions;
(g) is an undischarged bankrupt;
(h) is serving a sentence of imprisonment; or
(i) has, in the immediate preceding five years, served a term of imprisonment of at least three years.

[15] Having held the office of President from 25th January 2015 to 13th September 2016, the Respondent was not affected by the disqualification contained in Article 106(3) of the CAA, which reads:
106. (1) The term of office for a President is five years which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 105.
(2) A President shall hold office from the date the President-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn into office.
(3) A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as President. (Emphasis ours)

[16] The Presidential election of 11th August 2016 was conducted pursuant to Article 101 of the CAA, which reads:
101. Election of the President
(1) A President shall be elected by registered voters in accordance with Article 47 (1) and this Article.
(2) The Returning Officer shall declare the presidential candidate who receives more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast during the election as President-elect.
(3) If at the initial ballot a presidential candidate does not receive more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast, a second ballot shall be held within thirty-seven days of the initial ballot, where the only candidates shall be the presidential candidates who obtained —
(a) the highest and second highest number of valid votes cast in the initial ballot; or
(b) an equal number of the valid votes cast in the initial ballot, being the highest votes amongst the presidential candidates that stood for election to the office of President.
(4) A person may within seven days of the declaration made under clause (2), petition the Constitutional Court to nullify the election of a presidential candidate who took part in the initial ballot on the ground that—
(a) the person was not validly elected; or
(b) a provision of this Constitution or other law relating to presidential elections was not complied with.
(5) The Constitutional Court shall hear an election petition filed in accordance with clause (4) within fourteen days of the filing of the petition.
(6) The Constitutional Court may, after hearing an election petition—
(a) declare the election of the presidential candidate valid;
(b) nullify the election of the presidential candidate; or
(c) disqualify the presidential candidate from being a candidate in the second ballot.
(7) A decision of the Constitutional Court made in accordance with clause (6) is final.
(8) The presidential candidate who obtains the majority of the valid votes cast in the second ballot shall be declared President-elect. (Emphasis ours)

[17] On 15th August 2016, the Returning Officer declared the Respondent President-elect on the premise that the Respondent had satisfied Article 101(2) CAA having received 50.3% of the votes cast. The First Respondent was sworn into the office of President on Tuesday 13th September 2016, pursuant to Article 105 of the CAA, which reads:
105. Assumption of Office, Tenure of Office and Vacancy
(1) The President-elect shall assume office after being sworn in by the Chief Justice or, in the absence of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice.
(2) The President-elect shall be sworn into office on the Tuesday following—
(a) the seventh day after the date of the declaration of the presidential election results, if no petition has been filed in accordance with Article 103; or
(b) the seventh day after the date on which the Constitutional Court declares the election to be valid.
(3) Subject to clause (4),where the President-elect dies, resigns or is for a reason unable to assume office, the Vice-President-elect shall be sworn into, and assume the office of President, in accordance with clause (1).
(4) Subject to clause (5), where the inability of the President-elect to assume office is as a result of an event or circumstance beyond the control of the President-elect, the Vice-President-elect shall not be sworn into office.
(5) Apolitical party whose presidential candidate was declared President-elect or another person shall, within three days from the date on which the President-elect should have been sworn into office, petition the Constitutional Court to determine whether or not the inability of the President-elect to assume office is permanent.
(6) Where the Constitutional Court decides that the inability of the President-elect to assume office is permanent, the Vice-President-elect shall be sworn into office as President and assume office in accordance with clause (1).
(7) The Vice-President-elect who assumes office as President, in accordance with clause (3) or (6), shall appoint a person as Vice-President, subject to approval by the National Assembly, signified by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.
(8) Where the Vice-President elect who is supposed to assume the office of President as specified in clause (3) or (6) dies, resigns or is for another reason unable to assume the office of President —
(a) the Speaker shall perform the executive functions; and
(b) a presidential election shall be held within sixty days of the occurrence of the vacancy.
(9) The Speaker shall, perform he executive functions assumed in accordance with clause (8) except the power to make an appointment or dissolve the National Assembly.
(10) The Speaker shall, when the President-elect assumes office, complete the procedural and administrative handing over process within thirty days. (Emphasis ours)

The Filing of the Nomination Paper by the Respondent for the 2021 Election
[18] The Electoral Commission of Zambia, in readiness for the general election set for 12th August 2021, appointed the period between 17th and 20th May 2021, for filing of nomination papers by candidates for election to the office of President. On 17th May 2021, the Respondent, presented his nomination paper to the Returning Officer pursuant to Article 52(1) of the CAA supported by an affidavit to signify that the Respondent qualifies for nomination for election as President. The Returning Officer accepted the nomination paper and affidavit on the premise that the Respondent had met the qualifications specified for election to the office of President.
 
The Petitioners’ Case Against the Respondent
[19] The Petitioner contends that the Respondent:
(a) having been elected, sworn into the office of President on 25th January 2015 and having held the said office until 13th September 2016; and
(b) having been elected, sworn into the office of President from 13th September 2016, and having held the said office until the President-elect is sworn into the office of President after the election scheduled for 12th August 2021,
has contravened Article 106(3) of the Constitution by filing the nomination paper with the Returning officer (on 17th May 2021), supported by an affidavit stating that the Respondent is qualified for nomination as candidate for President for the election scheduled for 12th August 2021.
Relief Sought By The Petitioner
[20] The Petitioner prays for:
(a) a declaration that the Respondent having been elected, sworn into and held the office of President from 25th January 2015 to 13th September 2016, and having been declared winner of the 2016 election, sworn into and having held the office of President from 13th of September 2016, until the next President is elected under the 2021 election is not eligible for nomination for election as President in the election set for 12th of August 2021;
(b) a declaration that to the extent that the Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President scheduled for 12th August 2021, contravenes Article 106(3) of the Constitution, the said nomination is null and void; and
(c) an Order (of Certiorari) that the nomination paper filed by the Respondent with the Returning Officer and all documents in support of the Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President in the election of 12th August 2021, be removed forthwith into the Constitutional Court for purposes of quashing.
The Respondent’s Case
[21] The First Respondent’s case is that the First Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President was declared valid by the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission as the Returning Officer for presidential election. This is pursued further in paragraph 6 of the Answer wherein it is contended that the Returning Officer determined that the nomination of the First Respondent as a Presidential candidate in the forthcoming coming general election was valid on Monday, 17th May 2021 and the nominations were closed on 20th May 2021.
[22] The First Respondent concludes by contending that the no petition challenging the determination by the Returning Officer that the nomination of the First Respondent as Presidential Candidate is valid was or has been brought against the Commission within the period prescribed by Article 52(4) of the Constitution and that the decision of the Returning Officer is therefore final. The First Respondent contends that the Petition lacks merit.
Second Respondent’s Answer
[23] The issues, which are the subject of Petition were comprehensively dealt with in the case of Daniel Pule & Others v The Attorney General and Bampi Kapalasa. It has also been contended that the First Respondent did not violate Article 106(3) of the Constitution
Issues for Determination
[24] Based on the Respondents’ Answers the issues for determination by the Court can be summed up in these terms:
(a) Whether the Returning Officer has authority to and did declare the First Respondent’s nomination valid;
(b) Whether the subject of adjudication under Article 52(4) of the CAA is the acceptance of the nomination paper and affidavit in support of the nomination of a candidate of the nomination of a candidate
(c) Did the Court’s decision in Daniel Pule & Others v The Attorney General and Bampi Kapalasa address the validity of the nomination of the First Respondent to contest for election to the office of President in the election scheduled for 12th August 2021;
(d) Whether the First Respondent in breach of Article 106(3) of the Constitution.
The Authority of the Returning Officer and the Subject of Adjudication Under Article 52(4) of the Constitution
[25] The first two questions are considered together under this head. Article 52 of the CAA, which the Petitioners have relied upon in moving the Court reads:
52. Nominations
(1) A candidate shall file that candidate’s nomination paper to a returning officer, supported by an affidavit stating that the candidate is qualified for nomination as President, Member of Parliament or councillor, in the manner, on the day, and at the time and place set by the Electoral Commission by regulation.
(2) A returning officer shall, immediately on the filing of a nomination paper, in accordance with clause (1), duly reject the nomination paper if the candidate does not meet the qualifications or procedural requirements specified for election to that office.
(3) The information contained in a nomination paper and affidavit shall be published by the Electoral Commission, as prescribed.
(4) A person may challenge, before a court or tribunal, as prescribed, the nomination of a candidate within seven days of the close of nomination and the court shall hear the case within twenty-one days of its lodgement.
(5) The processes specified in clauses (1) to (4) shall be completed at least thirty days before a general election.
(6) Where a candidate dies, resigns or becomes disqualified in accordance with Article 70, 100 or 153 or a court disqualifies a candidate for corruption or malpractice, after the close of nominations and before the election date, the Electoral Commission shall cancel the election and require the filing of fresh nominations by eligible candidates and elections shall be held within thirty days of the filing of the fresh nominations. (Emphasis ours)

[26] Unlike Article 128(3) of the CAA which is a provision of general application Article 52 of the CAA is a special remedial provisions designed to deal exclusively with the validity of the nominations of candidates. According to Article 52(5) of the CAA what is contained in sub-Articles (1) to (4) is a process, which must be completed at least 30 days before the general election. The process is actuated by the candidate and not the Returning Officer, when a candidate files the candidate’s nomination paper to a Returning Officer, supported by an affidavit stating that the candidate is qualified for nomination for election to the office of President on the day, and at the time and place set by the Electoral Commission by regulation.
[27] The role of the Returning Officers is to either reject the nomination paper if the candidate does not meet the qualifications or procedural requirements specified for election to that office.
[28] After the acceptance of the nomination papers it is the duty of the Electoral Commission to cause the information contained in the nomination paper and the affidavit published. The acceptance of the nomination papers by the Returning Officer does not mean that the candidate’s nomination is valid. The authority to determine the validity of the nomination of a candidate is vested in the Constitutional Court and not in the Returning Officer. After all Article 1(5) of the CAA provides that “A matter relating to this Constitution shall be heard by the Constitutional Court.” Apart from the Constitutional Court no other institution or person can adjudicate on the legality of any act or omission under the CAA.
[29] The validity of nomination of a candidate for election to the office of President is dependent on the candidate meeting the qualifications set out in Article 100(1) and establishing that the grounds for disqualification for nomination for election to the office of President set out in Article 100(2) (a) to (i) and Article 106(3) of the Constitution do not apply to the candidate. Article 52(2) of the Constitution simply requires the Returning Officer to accept the nomination papers if the candidate meets the qualifications, which in the case of the First Respondent are set out in Articles 100(1) of the Constitution. It does not require the Returning to confirm that the grounds for disqualification set out in Article 100(2) and Article 106(3) of the Constitution do not apply to the candidate.
[30] Whilst the qualifications can be checked and confirmed by the Returning Officer the grounds for disqualification set out in Article 100(2) and 106(3) cannot be verified by the Returning Officer. The acceptance by the Returning Officer of the First Respondent’s nomination papers did not mean that the candidate’s nomination for election to the office of President is valid. That is an issue, which can be exclusively determined by the Constitutional Court. It follows that where the Court is moved pursuant to Article 52(4) of the CAA the subject of adjudication is not the constitutionality of the acceptance of the nomination paper and the affidavit by the Returning Officer, but the constitutionality of the candidate’s nomination for election to the office of President.
[31] The grounds for disqualifications are matters within the knowledge of the First Respondent. For instance, paragraph 9 of the Affidavit for Presidential Candidate/ Running Mate devised by the Electoral Commission requires the candidate for nomination for election to the office of President to state: “I qualified for nomination as a Presidential candidate and the disqualifications in Article 100(2) do not apply to me.” The burden is on the person with information to the contrary to establish the converse and not for the First respondent to do so. The First Respondent cannot prove the negative but it is for the Petitioners in this case to disprove the negative.
[32] The subject of adjudication under Article 52(4) of the Constitution is “the nomination of the candidate” and not the acceptance of the nomination papers by the Returning Officer. In this case it is the First Respondent that represented to the Returning Officer on oath that he qualifies for nomination for election to the office of President in the 2021 general election. It is not the function of the Returning Officer the investigate the accuracy or truthfulness of what is contained in the nomination paper and affidavit deponed by the First Respondent and adjudicate on the constitutionality of what is averred therein.
[33] Article 52(4) of the Constitution provides a two-phase vetting process of the nomination of a candidate for election to the office of President: the first stage is carried out by the Returning officer whose authority is either to accept or reject the nomination papers and the second phase is actuated when the nomination of a candidate is not rejected by the Returning Officer and that authority to actuate the procedure under Article 52(4) of the Constitution is vested in any person to move the Court.
[34] The Returning officer has no authority under Article 52(4) of the CAA to adjudicate on the validity of the nomination of a candidate, his authority is either to accept or reject the nomination papers. It is for anyone who does not agree with the published information contained in the nomination paper and affidavit in support of the candidate’s nomination to move the Court. The authority to determine the validity of the nomination of a candidate is vested in the Constitutional Court and not in the Returning Officer.
[35] In this case the process under Article 52 of the CAA was actuated by the First Respondent filing his nomination paper with the Returning officer, supported by an affidavit stating that the candidate is qualified for nomination as President in the manner, on the day, and at the time and place set by the Electoral Commission. It is the validity of that assertion by the First Respondent that is the subject of adjudication by the Constitutional Court under Article 52(4) of the CAA and not the acceptance of the nomination papers by the Returning Officer.
[36] In this case the contention of the Petitioner is that the First Respondent is disqualified by Article 106(3) of the Constitution from contesting for election to the office of President in the election scheduled for 12th August 2021. The Returning Officer has no constitutional authority to adjudicate on such a contentious issue. Furthermore, it is for the First Respondent to defend the constitutionality of his nomination and not the Returning Officer.
[37] Article 1(3) of the CAA provides that: “This Constitution shall bind all persons in Zambia, State organs and State institutions.” The First Respondent is bound by the Constitution. It follows that in filing his nomination paper and affidavit with the Returning Officer pursuant to Article 52(1) of the CAA the First Respondent was under a constitutional obligation to ensure that he complied with the provisions of the Constitution that have a bearing on his nomination. In this case his contention is that he qualifies and the contention of the Petitioners is that he does not because he is barred by Article 106(3) of the Constitution from taking part in the election scheduled for 12th August 2021, since he has twice held the office of President. Only the First Respondent can respond to the issues raised in this Petition and the First Respondent has in fact done so in his Answer filed on 31st May 2021.
[38] It is also important to note that there is no allegation of breach or non-compliance with the Constitution alleged against the Returning Officer in the Petition. The alleged contravention of the Constitution which is the subject of adjudication in this case is against the First Respondent. Additionally, the outcome of the proceedings under Article 52(4) of the CAA can either affect or benefit the First Respondent. However, decision of the Court in this case as framed by the Petitioner will have no impact on the Returning Officer and hence the decision not to include him to the proceedings.
[39] It is also imperative to point out that the Petitioners have framed their case against the First Respondent as set out in the Petition. The Respondent is therefore require to Answer to the case framed by the Petitioners and not as the First Respondent believes ought to have been framed. The Petitioners’ case against the First Respondent ought to be adjudicated upon by this Court as framed and not as the First Respondent contends ought to have been settled.
[40] Be that as it may, since it is the position of First Respondent that the Returning Officers ought to have been included to these proceedings, our response is that non-joinder or inclusion to of the Returning Officer to these proceedings cannot defeat this Petition. The issues in contention can adequately be resolved between the Petitioners and the First Respondent. In any case Order 5, rule 2 of the Constitutional Court Rules provides that: “An Originating process shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may, in every proceeding, deal with the matter in dispute.” The Returning Officer has no interest in this matter and if he does, nothing stopped the Returning Officer or the Electoral Commission of Zambia from joining these proceedings.
Whether the Issues in Contention Have Been Determined by the Constitution Court
[41] The Respondents contend that the issues for adjudication in this petition were determined by this Court in the case of Daniel Pule & Others v Attorney General, which was followed Bampi Aubrey Kapalasa & Another v The Attorney General. It follows, they contend that pursuit of this Petition is an abuse of the Court process. It has been averred in paragraph 4 of the First Respondent’s Answer that the issues raised in the Petition were comprehensively dealt by this Court in the case of Pule and Kapalasa case. What follows in paragraph 4 is the exposition of what they contend this Court said, which has a bearing on this case. In effect that the Respondents are raising issue estoppel.
[42] The Second Respondent bluntly presents the issues in paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of the Answer. It is not enough to allege as the Respondents have done that the issues raised in the Petition were decided in the Pule case and followed in the Kapalasa case. More needs to be said. There are conditions that must to be met before issue estoppel can be relied upon as a defence by any party to the proceedings. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2) , Lord Guest set out the conditions that must be met before issue estoppel can be raised:
(a) that the same question has been decided;
(b) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and
(c) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised, or their privies.
[43] While the decision of the Constitutional Court in Pule and Kapalasa are final the issues decided therein are not the same as the issues in this case. Apart from the Attorney none of the parties to this Petition were parties in the Pule case and Kapalasa case. We will examine each issue.
The Same Question has been Decided
[44] Unlike in this case, where the Court has been moved by way of a petition in Pule and Kapalasa the Court was moved by originating summons, which is provided for in Order 5, rule 2 of the Constitution Court Rules 2016, (CCR), which reads:
2. (1) The following matters shall be commenced by originating notice of motion:
(a) a matter relating to the Republican President or Republican Vice-President, other than the nomination or election of the Republican President or Republican Vice-president; and
(b) an application to review a decision of the Electoral Commission of Zambia in the delimitation of constituencies and wards.
(2) A matter relating to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be commenced by originating summons. (Emphasis ours)

[45] The Applicants sought the interpretation of Article 106(3) and (6) of the CAA and framed the question for determination in these terms:
1. Whether His Excellency President Edgar Chagwa Lungu will have served two full terms for purposes of Article 106 (3) as read with Article 106 (6) of the Constitution of Zambia at the expiry of his current term;
2. Whether, as a matter of the Constitutional law of the Republic of Zambia, His Excellency President Edgar Chagwa Lungu is eligible for election as President for another 5 year term following his current term of office which commenced on 13th September, 2016.

[46] The second question was never addressed by the Court. Furthermore, the Court did not answer the first question as framed by the Applicants because the purpose of the interpretation of the Constitution is not to address individuals but provide pronouncements of general application. The Court went on to restate the question in these terms:
Whether in terms of Article 106 (3) and (6), a presidential term of office that ran from 25th January, 2015 to 13th September, 2016 and straddled two constitutional regimes can or should be considered as a full term?

[47] In this case, the Court is called upon to adjudicate on the alleged contravention of Article 106(3) of the CAA by the First Respondent. The issue for determination is whether the First Respondent having been elected, sworn into the office of President on 25th January 2015 and having held the said office until 13th September 2016; and having been elected, sworn into the office of President from 13th September 2016, and having held the said office until the President-elect is sworn into the office of President after the election scheduled for 12th August 2021, has contravened Article 106(3) of the CAA by filing the nomination paper with the Returning Officer, supported by an affidavit stating that the First Respondent is qualified for nomination as candidate for President for the election scheduled for 12th August 2021. Issue estoppel does not arise in this case.

Parties to the Proceedings Must be the Same
[48] The party alleging or raising issue estoppel must must establish that the parties in the cases decided first are the same as the parties in the present case. There is no evidence to support that position and the Respondents in this case have not averred that they parties are the same. Apart from the Second Respondent none of the parties to this case were parties to the case of Pule or Kapalasa.
[49] Most importantly, the First Respondent who is likely to be affected by the outcome of this case was not a parties to the proceedings in Pule and Kapalasa case. The Court could not therefore have adjudicated on his eligibility to contest the 2021 election when he was not before the Court. As was stated by the Supreme Court in Maxwell Mwamba & Stora Solomon Mbuzi v Attorney General of Zambia, no court of justice properly informed and guided can pronounce on the rights of a person that is not before that Court. We submit that the position taken by the Court in that case is sound law and ask the Court to embrace it. In that case, the applicants had challenged the decision of the President to appoint two members of his political party to ministerial positions on the premise that they were implicated in drug related transactions. However, they were not made parties to the application. The Supreme Court said:
We must now comment on the form and direction taken by these proceedings. Although the motion ostensibly questioned whether there was dignity and leadership in the exercise by the President of his Constitutional power to appoint the two Ministers, the blows were landing on two individuals who have never been heard and who stood to be condemned unheard and stripped of office. No court of justice can be called upon to make a declaration, which is always a discretionary remedy, when obvious injustice would be visited upon persons who have not been heard but who would be directly affected by a declaratory order in proceedings to which they have not been made parties. (Emphasis ours)

[50] This Court did not in Pule and Kapalasa case pronounce on the eligibility of the First Respondent to contest the 2021 general election when he was not before Court. The Court in Pule answered the questions it reframed. There is therefore no basis for raising issue estoppel in this case.

The Decision of the Constitutional Court in Daniel Pule and Followed in Kapalasa is Unsound at Law
[51] Even if we ignore issue estoppel, the decision of this Court in Pule and followed in Kapalasa is not sound on account of the issues the Court took into account to arrive at the said decision. Whilst the Court is bound by the concept of stare decisis, the concept is not absolute. The Court can depart from its own decision for cause. This is the perfect case in which the Court must vacate its decision. One of reasons for doing so, is where the foundation or reasoning which informed the decision of the Court is unsound because incorrect information was relied upon.
[52] In this case it is unsafe to uphold the decision in Pule and followed in Kapalasa because:
(a) the Court restated the question on its motion and did not invite the parties to address the Court on the restated question;
(b) the decision was premised on the fact that the period between 25th January 2015 and 13th September 2016, straddled between two constitutional regimes a concept, which is alien to constitutional law; and
(c) the Court sought to give effect to the intention of Parliament in interpreting Article 106 of the CAA when the said provision was never devised by the Parliament but the Technical Committee on the Drafting of the Zambian Constitution.
[53] We will examine each ground we have raised below.

 
Parties Were Never Heard on the Restated Question
[54] As stated above the petitioners in Pule an Kapalasa presented two questions for determination by the Court. The parties submitted on these two questions thereafter the case was closed and the Court retired to write its judgment. It was in the course of writing the judgment that the Court on its motion restated the first question to read:

Applicants’ Question Question Re-stated by the Court
Whether His Excellency President Edgar Chagwa Lungu will have served two full terms for purposes of Article 106 (3) as read with Article 106 (6) of the Constitution of Zambia at the expiry of his current term;
Whether in terms of Article 106 (3) and (6), a presidential term of office that ran from 25th January, 2015 to 13th September, 2016 and straddled two constitutional regimes can or should be considered as a full term?

[55] These were two different questions. The arguments advanced by the parties in relation to the question as framed by the Applicants cannot be used or relied upon in answering the question framed by the Court. None of the parties were heard by the Court on the restated question. The real issue, which was submitted by the Applicants for determination was never considered by the Court. The decision by this Court to restate the question framed by the Applicants without inviting the parties the opportunity to address the Court on the reframed question contravened Article 18(9) of Constitution, which reads:
(9) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be independent and impartial; and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.

[56] This Court had no right statutory, constitutional or otherwise to inject itself in this case. That it did was a gross violation of Article 18(9) of the Constitution. This Court is not exempt from the application of the Bill of Rights. That the Court did undermined its independence and impartiality making its decision unsafe and unsound to be allowed to stand let alone to be relied upon.
[57] The Supreme Court has addressed what the Court should do if there is need to depart from the issues framed by the parties. We are alive to the fact that the decisions of the Supreme Court are not binding on this Court. We nonetheless bring them to the attention of this Court because they constitute good law and also for purposes of developing consistence within the judicature on this aspect of the law. In Atlantic Bakery Limited v Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation, the Supreme Court noted:
A court is not to decide on an issue which has not been pleaded. Put differently, a court should confine its decision to the questions raised in the pleadings. It can thus not grant relief which is not claimed. Litigation is for the parties; not the court. The court has no business extending or expanding the boundaries of litigation beyond the scope defined by i.e parties in their pleadings. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction to set up a different or new case for the parties.

[58] The decision in Atlantic Bakery Limited was followed by the Supreme Court in Richard H. Chama & Others v National Pension Scheme & Others. The Court observed:
7.32. We express our disapproval with the approach adopted by the lower court judge in this case. The parties had structured for themselves the agreed facts and issues for the determination of the court, never mind that such a course was taken at the behest of the judge himself. Among the facts agreed by all parties was that the scheme subsisting between them was a defined benefit scheme.
7.33. The learned judge chose to alter the agreed facts by literally disputing what all the parties stated through their pleading. He substituted his own construction of what the facts ought to have been, not because of any factual evidence laid before him, but from his own assumptions.
7.34. As there was no disagreement whatsoever as to the kind of occupational pension scheme subsisting between the parties, the learned judge had no business creating issue over the undisputed facts and then proceeding to resolve it. We thus agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned lower – court judge overreached himself in making a finding which contradicted the parties’ own agreed position.

[59] The Supreme Court went on to conclude in these terms:
7 .35. As we cautioned in Atlantic Bakery Ltd v. Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation Ltd.:
— a court should confine its decision to the questions raised in the pleadings — Litigation is for the parties, not the court. The court has no business extending the boundaries of litigation beyond the scope defined by the parties in their pleadings. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction to set up a different or new case for the parties.
7 .36. We must add, for good measure, that in our adversarial system, a judge is required and is indeed obliged to decide cases on the evidence presented in court by the parties. If judges apply their own knowledge or personal perceptions not informed by the evidence presented to them, they may deprive the parties of the opportunity to address such Information and perceptions with evidence and submission. The upshot of our reflection is that ground one has merit and we uphold it.

[60] Observance Article 18(9) of the Constitution does not mean that the Court has no role in ensuring that the issues between the parties are properly framed and decided. Where this is the case the Supreme Court has discussed the approach that the trial Court must take, which we ask this Court to embrace. In Murray & Roberts Construction Limited and Kaddoura Construction Limited v Lusaka Premium Health Limited and Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa the trial Court was moved on an ex-parte application for leave to issue a writ of possession. Instead of confining itself to the issue raised in the summons, the trial Court went on to consider and decide on other issues in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
[61] The Supreme Court said:
The record of appeal clearly shows that the application for determination by the trial judge was an ex parte summons for leave to issue a writ of possession to facilitate the sale of Stand No. 1292 Chelstone, Lusaka. However, instead of confining himself to this specific application, the trial Judge went beyond his jurisdiction by making decisions on matters that had not been canvassed by the parties under the guise of ‘inherent jurisdiction’. We must emphasise here that the so-called ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of a trial judge must not be exercised willy-nilly but with caution and judiciously.

[62] Whilst Courts are encouraged to exercise their inherent jurisdiction that jurisdiction must be exercised judiciously. According to the Supreme Court in Murray & Roberts Construction Limited and Kaddoura Construction Limited v Lusaka Premium Health Limited and Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, if in the judgment of the trial Court there was a problem in the manner in which the judgment in default had been obtained, the most judicious way of handling such a situation was for the trial Judge to request the parties to address the Court on the issue before making its decision on the point. The Supreme Court said:
If in his judgment, the trial Judge was of the view that there was some irregularity in the manner the default judgment was obtained and that there was an abuse of the Court process, he ought to have requested the parties, particularly the appellants who had filed the application he was considering to address him on the issues he had in mind but had not been presented by any of the parties before making the orders he made.

[63] In Pule Court restated the Applicants’ question and answered it. None of the parties were invited by the Court to address the Court on the restated question. The decision in Pule and followed in Kapalasa was volunteered by the Court in addition to having been delivered in violation of Article 18(9) of CAA. It is therefore unsafe and unsound to follow.

Premise of the Decision is Wrong: Straddling two Constitutional Regimes
[64] The question framed and answered by the Court was premised on a statement of fact that was assumed to be correct and on which none of the parties to the proceedings were asked to confirm: that the presidential term of office that ran from 25th January, 2015 to 13th September, 2016 “straddled two constitutional regimes”. The idea that the period in issue straddled two constitutional regimes was never part of the question framed by the Applicants and restated by the Court. This concept is alien to constitutional law. No period can ever straddle between two constitutional regime and since independence on 24th October 1964, to date no period has ever straddled between two constitutional regimes. The practice has always been for one constitutional order to be replaced by another constitutional regime on the appointed day.
[65] The constitutional order in place just before 24th October 1964 was revoked and replaced by Independence Constitution on the same day and time. There was an instant transition from one constitutional order to another on the same day. The same happened in 1973. The independence Constitution ceased to exist on 25th August 1973 and was on the same replaced by the Constitution of 1973. Similarly, the 1973 Constitution ceased to be law on 24th August 1991 and was replaced by the Constitution of 1991, which came in force on the same day. Unlike the previous Constitutions of 1964 and 1973, the 1991 Constitution has never ceased to exist but has been amended in 1996, by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1996. The Constitution of 1991 was again amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016.
[66] The idea that the period from 25th January 2015 to 13th September 2016, straddled between two constitutional regimes is not support by any facts on the ground nor by the Constitution itself. There has been no break in the constitutional order since 1991.

In Search of the Intention of Parliament
[67] In arriving at its decision that the period between 25th January 2015, and 13th September 2016, straddled between two constitutional regimes, the Court in Pule was driven by the desire to given effect Parliament intention behind Article 106 of the CAA. This is evident at page ——— wherein the Court said:
Article 106 (6) thus presents a novel situation, providing that a person will be deemed not to have served a full term of office as President if at the time he or she assumes office, less than 3 years remain bef,ore the date of the next general elections. The intention of the Legislature as shown from the import of Article 106 is that a person can serve one two serve year terms amounting to 10 years. However, with the enactment of Article 106 (6) two other scenarios now obtain. Under Article 106 (6) (a), it is possible that a person can serve for a period of less than 10 years, being! one term of at least 3 years and another term of 5 years and these will cbunt as two full terms. The converse is also true under Article 106 (6) (b) Lhere it is now possible for one to occupy the office of President for a perild which is less than a full term in addition to two full terms of office eaning that a President can be in the office for a total of almost 13 yJars. We have decided to add this for clarity.
Therefore, it is clear from the above provisions that when the Constitution is read holistically, we believe, the intention of the Legislature was that when a person takes over the unexpired term of a previous president, that person should be able to serve a substantial part of the unexpired term in order for such a term to be considered a a full term.

[68] Reference to the intention of Parliament is also evident when the Court said:
In view of the above position, the question is: Did the/framers of the Constitution in the transitional provisions under the 2016/ Constitutional amendments, make provision for what was to happen to the incumbent President’s term of office which straddled two constitutional regimes as to how it should be treated Perusal of both the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2016 as well as the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) A l No. 2 of 2016 has shown that these contain very limited provision(s) as lo what or how the remaining term of office of the immediate predecessorf tenure should be treated. Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of Zambia ( mendment) Act No. 1 of 2016 provides as follows: –
“7. (1) The President shall continue to serve as President or the 1 unexpired term of that office as specified by the constitution in accordance with the Constitution.”
The above provision clearly shows that although the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2016 provided for the clntinuation of the President in the office of President, it made no provisifns for how the period served from January, 2015 to September, 2016 which straddled two constitutional regimes was to be treated in view of the change in the constitutional provisions from the limitation based on being ‘twice elected’ to ‘holding office’ for two terms. In this regard, we agree with Counsel for the Applicants that the Legislature did not address that laspect in the transitional provisions. The question, therefore, is: Was it the intention of the framers of the Constitution to not provide for transitional provisions relating to this term?

[69] The Court continued by saying:
The foregoing shows that where it is determined that an Act failed to include express transitional provisions, it is for the Coult to draw an inference or to attempt to discern what the Legislature must have intended. The Supreme Court appUed this approach in the cases of Lumina and Mwiinga v The Attorney-General and Attorney-General and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy v Lewanika and 4 ithers22 where the respective transitional provisions did not expressly Jrovide for the Members of Parliament who crossed the floor. In the Lewafka” case, the Supreme Court put it as follows:-
“It follows, therefore, that whenever the strict interpreta~ion of a statute gives rise to unreasonable and an unjust situation, it is our view that judges can and should use their good common sense to remedy it – that is by reading words in if necessary – so as to do what parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind.”
Therefore, the question is: What could have been the intention of the Legislature on this aspect in relation to the transitional arrlngements for a presidential term straddling two constitutional regimes? Our firm view is that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to not provide for the period that was served and that straddled two constitutional regimes as to how it should be treated. This is so because, as stated above, a holistic consideration of the relevant provisions in this case will clearly show that the intention was/is to allow or enable a person who assumes the office of president to complete the unexpired period of the term of another president to serve a substantial part of the five year term of office in order for that term to counJ as a full term pursuant to Article 106 (6) of the Constitution as amended.

[70] Whilst it is accepted in in certain instances, in the interpretation of the Constitution, to establish the intention of Parliament, it must first be established as a fact that the provision that is the subject of interpretation was in fact devised by Parliament and or was the subject of debate in Parliament. Copies of the Hansard must be presented before Court to show that indeed the provision was framed, considered and or discussed by Parliament. No such evidence was available in the case of Pule. The quest for the intention of Parliament behind a constitutional provision cannot therefore be contrived in an effort to arrive at a desire conclusion. It must be backed by evidence.
[71] The evidence we have provided before Court shows that the Constitution of Zambia Bill No. 16 of 2016 and the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 17 of 2016, were discussed on two separate days by the National Assembly. In both exhibits there is no discussion or reference by the National Assembly to the provision of the Bill that became Article 106 of the Constitution.
[72] The evidence before Court, which we will refer to as we consider the Petition on merit shows that Article 106 of the Constitution was not birthed by Parliament but the Technical Committee on the Drafting of the Zambian Constitution appointed by President Sata. It follows that the Court in the Pule case ought to have reviewed the Report of the Committee in order the establish the Committee’s intention behind Article 106.
[73] The foundation of the Court’s reasoning in Pule and followed in Kapalasa was very wrong decision is therefore unsafe and unsound to maintain. This Court presents the Court with a unique opportunity to overrule itself and vacate the two decision. It is an opportunity for the Court to pronounce itself on the implications of Article 106(3) of the CAA on the constitutionality of the First Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President in the election set for 12th August 2021.

The Petitioner’s Arguments on the Merit of the Petition
[74] The substance of the Petitioner’s case framed in paragraph 89 of the Petition is that the Respondent having been elected, sworn into the office of President on 25th January 2015 and having held the said office until 13th September 2016; and having been elected, sworn into the office of President from 13th September 2016, and having held the said office until the President-elect is sworn into the office of President after the election scheduled for 12th August 2021, contravened Article 106(3) of the CAA on 17th May 2021, when he filed the nomination paper with the Returning Officer, supported by an affidavit stating that he is qualified for nomination as candidate for election to the office of President in the election scheduled for 12th August 2021.
[75] In paragraph 6(6) of the Answer the First Respondent denies being in breach of Article 106(3) of the Constitution. Breach of the Constitution by the First Respondent is also denied by the Second Respondent in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Answer. The burden is therefore for the Petitioners to prove the contravention of Article 106(3) of the Constitution.
[76] In issue in this Petition is the implication of Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 106(3) of the Constitution in particular. Article 106 of the CAA in its entirety reads:
106. (1) The term of office for a President is five years which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 105.
(2) A President shall hold office from the date the President-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn into office.
(3) A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as President. (Emphasis ours)
(4) The office of President becomes vacant if the President—
(a) dies;
(b) resigns by notice in writing to the Speaker of the National Assembly; or
(c) otherwise ceases to hold office under Article 81,107 or 108.
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of President, except under Article 81 —
(a) the Vice-President shall immediately assume the office of President; or
(b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of President, the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to —
(i) make an appointment; or
(ii) dissolve the National Assembly;
and a presidential election shall be held within sixty days after the occurrence of the vacancy. (Emphasis ours)
(6) If the Vice-President assumes the office of President, in accordance with clause (5)(a), or a person is elected to the office of President as a result of an election held in accordance with clause 5(b), the Vice-President or the President-elect shall serve for the unexpired term of office and be deemed, for the purposes of clause (3)—
(a) to have served a full term as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, at least three years remain before the date of the next general election; or
(b) not to have served a term of office as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, less than three years remain before the date of the next general election.

[77] It is not enough for the First Respondent to aver that he is not in breach of Article 106(3) of the CAA. More needs to be proffered to show why he is not affected by Article 106(3) of the CAA since has twice held the office of President. Be that as it may, it is our position that the import of Article 106(3) of the Constitution cannot be determined in a vacuum but in the context of its history. There is need to determine and how and why it arose and why it was framed in the manner it reads. This is because every Constitution of a country is a product of the history of that country. The CAA whose provision the Court is called upon to consider, is a product of many years of our experience with constitutional rule. The background to the constitutional provisions dealing with the eligibility of a candidate to contest for election to the office of President is therefore necessary in addressing the issues raised in the Petition. The need to consider the history of a constitutional provision in order to give effect to its meaning was considered by the South African Constitutional Court in S v. Makwanyane & Another.
[78] In that case the South African Government in its written arguments dealt with debate which took place on the death penalty before the commencement of the constitutional negotiations. The Court had to resolve whether this approach was proper, although there was no dispute on the same. Chaskalson J. started by noting the position of the South African Courts on background information in the interpretation of ordinary legislation and said the following in relation to the interpretation of the Constitution:
In countries in which the constitution is similarly the supreme law, it is not unusual for the courts to have regard to the circumstances existing at the time the constitution was adopted, including the debates and writings which formed part of the process. The United States Supreme Court pays attention to such matters, and its judgments frequently contain reviews of the legislative history of the provision in question, including references to debates, and statements made, at the time the provision was adopted. The German Constitutional Court also has regard to such evidence. The Canadian Supreme Court has held such evidence to be admissible, and has referred to the historical background including the pre-confederation debates for the purpose of interpreting provisions of the Canadian Constitution, although it attaches less weight to such information than the United States Supreme Court does. It also has regard to ministerial statements in Parliament in regard to the purpose of particular legislation. In India, whilst speeches of individual members of Parliament or the Convention are apparently not ordinarily admissible, the reports of drafting committees can, according to Seervai, “be a helpful extrinsic aid to construction.” Seervai cites Kania CJ in A. K. Gopalan v The State for the proposition that whilst not taking “… into consideration the individual opinions of Members of Parliament or Convention to construe the meaning of a particular clause, when a question is raised whether a certain phrase or expression was up for consideration at all or not, a reference to debates may be permitted.” The European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights all allow their deliberations to be informed by travaux preparatoires.

[79] The Court went on to say:
Our Constitution was the product of negotiations conducted at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process. The final draft adopted by the forum of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process was, with few changes, adopted by Parliament. The Multi-Party Negotiating Process was advised by technical committees, and the reports of these committees on the drafts are the equivalent of the travaux preparatoires, relied upon by the international tribunals. Such background material can provide a context for the interpretation of the Constitution and, where it serves that purpose, I can see no reason why such evidence should be excluded. The precise nature of the evidence, and the purpose for which it may be tendered, will determine the weight to be given to it. (Emphasis ours)

[80] Chaskalson went on to conclude:
Background evidence may, however, be useful to show why particular provisions were or were not included in the Constitution. It is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage in the development of our constitutional law to express any opinion on whether it might also be relevant for other purposes, nor to attempt to lay down general principles governing the admissibility of such evidence. It is sufficient to say that where the background material is clear, is not in dispute, and is relevant to showing why particular provisions were or were not included in the Constitution, it can be taken into account by a Court in interpreting the Constitution. These conditions are satisfied in the present case. (Emphasis ours)

[81] To properly situate this issue it is necessary, we submit, to consider the history of the provisions governing the tenure of the office of President. It is the intention or position of the people on the tenure of the office of President that must in the end be given effect by this Court and not the intention of Parliament as was held in the Pule case. Article 5 of the CAA provides:
5. (1) Sovereign authority vests in the people of Zambia, which may be exercised directly or through elected or appointed representatives or institutions.
(2) Power that is not conferred by or under this Constitution on any State organ, State institution, State officer, Constitutional office holder or other institution or person is reserved for the people.
(3) The people of Zambia shall exercise their reserved power through a referendum, as prescribed.

[82] It is the sovereign will of the people on the tenure of the office of President that the Court must establish and give effect in this case. In the Petition we have set out historically how the people’s position on the tenure of the office of President has evolved on the years and the Respondents have not contradicted the narrative nor disputed the veracity of the documents relied upon, which are publicly available.
[83] In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd Lord Wilberforce discussed the conditions that must be satisfied in order to rely on the travaux préparatoires, or materials necessary to establish the intention of the drafters of the instrument that is the subject of interpretation by the Court. His Lordship said:
My lords, if one accepts that this reflects a recognition on the part of French law that in the interest of uniformity with English tendencies (perhaps rather overstated by the Advocate General) the use of travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of treaties should be cautious, I think that it would be proper for us, in the same interest, to recognise that there may be cases where such travaux préparatoires can profitably be used. These cases should be rare, and only where two conditions are fulfilled: first, that the material involved is public and accessible, and, secondly, that the travaux préparatoires clearly and indisputably point to a definite legislative intention. It would I think be unnecessarily restrictive to exclude from consideration, as travaux préparatoires, the work of the Paris Conference of 1925, and the work of CITEJA before 1929, both of which are well known to those concerned with air law, in any case where a clear intention were to be revealed. If the use of travaux préparatoires is limited in this way, that would largely overcome the 703 two objections which may properly be made: first, that relating to later acceding states (as to this see Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p 628, citing the International Law Commission) and, secondly, the general objection that individuals ought not to be bound by discussions or negotiations of which they may never have heard.

[84] The materials before Court satisfy these two conditions. All the materials are public and easily accessible. They have been offered in order to establish intention of the framers of Article 106 of the CAA. Accepting the contention of the First Respondent that he qualifies for nomination for election to the office of President for the third time with the consequence that he will hold the office of President for more than 10 years, if he is elected must be supported by evidence that such a possibility was intended by the Committee. This possibility is outlined by the First Respondent’s Advocates in paragraphs 4(d), (e), (f), and (g). The question for determination by the Court is whether there is any historical material that support such a possibility. It is our position that there is no such material and the available travaux préparatoires show a disdain for such a possibility.

The Tenure of the Office of President Between 1964 and 1991
[85] The starting point is that the Independence Constitution did not limit the number of times one could contest and hold the office of President. This was not the issue during the Constitutional Conference of Northern Rhodesia, which devised the Independence Constitution.
[86] The mood of the people changed eight years later when the Chona was appointed to devise the One-Party Constitution of 1973. There was an express demand by the people to limit the number of times one was to hold the office of President and pave way for other to ascend to the highest office in the country. The Commission noted in its Report:
Petitioners expressed divergent views on this issue. Varying terms of office ranging from six months to life presidency were suggested. After discussing this matter, we came to the conclusion that the post of President should be within reach of as many aspiring as possible. . (Emphasis ours)

[87] The Commission recommended:
WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND –
(1) That the term of office for a President be five years; and
(2) That a President be eligible to stand for a second term of five years after which he shall not be eligible to stand as President for a period of at least five years; thereafter he shall be eligible to stand for a new term of five years. (Emphasis ours)

[88] The recommendations of the Commission was rejected in favour of the position contained in the Independence Constitution. As a result the Constitution of 1973 did not limit the number of times one could hold the office of President. It was only seventeen years later that the issue surfaced again when the Constitutional Commission headed by Professor Mvunga was constituted to draft the Constitution for the Third Republic. The majority of the people that made representations to the Commission favoured limitating on the number of times one could hold the office of President.
[89] The findings of the Commission was that “a limitation in the term of office of President to one of two five-year terms was the most favoured by the petitioners.” —. The Commission accordingly recommends that the President’s term of office be limited to two five-year terms; the Presidential term of office be co-terminous with that of the National Assembly.
[90] For purposes of establishing the intention of the Committee in devising Article 106 of the Constitution it is important to consider how the Commission dealt with the time served by President between independence in 1964 and 1991, when the new Constitution was being devised. The Commission decided that the provision of the Constitution on the limitation of the tenure of the office of President should not have a retro-active effect but should be forwarded looking. The period before 1991 was not to be considered in limiting a candidates tenure to the office of President. This was specifically addressed in Article 35 of the Constitution, which read:
Article 35 Tenure of Office of President
(1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five years.
(2) After the commencement of this Constitution no person who holds or has held office as President for two terms of five years each, shall be eligible for re-election to that office.
(3) For the purposes of clause (2) the period of two terms of five years each shall be computed from the commencement of this Constitution.
(4) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker of the National Assembly resign his office.
(5) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution shall unless:
(a) he resigns his office; or
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved;
continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President assumes office.
[91] The import of this provision is worth considering in detail as it has a bearing on what is being pursued by the First Respondent. According to Article 35(2) of the Constitution of 1991, the person holding the office of President was guaranteed to hold the office of President for two terms of five years each. Thereafter he was not eligible to stand or re-election. The implication was that as long as the person holding the office of President had not held the office for two terms of five years each he was entitled to contest for election. Under this provision it would be in order for person who has finished the first term of five years to contest for election to the office of President for as many times as he wishes provided in his second and subsequent terms in the office of President he does not serve for a period of five years. It is this possibility, which defeated the essence of limiting the tenure of the office of President that was addressed by the Mwanakatwe Constitution.

The tenure of the Office of President From 1996 to 2016.
[92] The amendments to the tenure of the office of President under the Constitution of 1991 as amended in 1996 require special consideration for two reasons. It shows for the first time how the role of Parliament in determining the final version of the Article 35, which subsisted until it was replaced by Article 106 of the Constitution as amended in 2016. The starting point is the work of the Mwanakatwe Constitution Commission. The position of the people had not changed. they still favoured a limit on the tenure of the office of President. The Commission noted:
From an evaluation of evidence and the maze of options, the Commission came to the conclusion that there were no strong no strong grounds justifying departure from the present constitutional arrangement. The commission therefore recommends that every president should hold office for a period of five years and should be eligible to re-election to one more five-year term. (Emphasis ours)

[93] It is also important to note that the Mwanakatwe Constitution Commission for the first time recommended the introduction of the Vice-President who was to be elected at the time as the President and assume the office of President in the event of a vacancy without the need for an election. Article 82 of the draft Constitution devised by the Mwanakatwe addressed these issues. It read:
82. (1) A persons shall be qualified to be to be a candidate for election as President if –
(a) he or she es is a citizen of Zambia born in Zambia;
(b) his parents or her parents are Zambian citizens born in Zambia;
(c) he or she has attained the age of thirty-five years;
(d) he or she is of good character; and
(e) he or she is otherwise qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly.
(2) no person who has twice been elected as president shall be eligible for re-election to that office.
(3) If the vice president holds the office of president for a period of not less than three years he shall be deemed to have been elected as president for purposes of clause (2). (Emphasis ours)

[94] To cure the problem created by the by Article 35(2) of the Constitution of 1991, the draft Constitution in Article 82(2) changed from two terms of five years to being elected twice. In effect the concern was no longer about the number of terms of five years one held the office of President but to the number of times one was elected to the office of President. The length of time one held the office of President was immaterial.
[95] Since the Vice-President was to assume the office of President without being elected in the event of a vacancy in the office President Article 82(3) of the draft Constitution addressed how that term was to be treated for purposes of limiting the number of times one was to be elected to the office of President.
[96] This provision is the forerunner to Article 106(6) of the Constitution, the subject of this Petition. According to the Mwanakatwe Commission, if the vice-president holds the office of president for a period of not less than three years he was to be deemed to have been elected as president for purposes of clause (2). This provision, we contend is the same as Article 106(6) of the CAA. It deals with how the period to be served by the vice-president following a vacancy in the office of President was to be treated for purposes of limiting the number of times one was to be elected or hold the office of President.
[97] The Mwanakatwe Constitution never became law. The Government decided to amend the Constitution instead. However, the Bill which was passed and became known as the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1996, used a much stronger language on the tenure to the office of President. Article 35(2) of the Constitution 1991 as amended in 1996, read:
35. [Tenure of office of President]
(1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five years.
(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution or any other Law no person who has twice been elected as President shall be eligible for re-election to that office.
(3) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker of the National Assembly, resign his office.
(4) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution shall, unless —
(a) he resigns his office;
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37; or
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved;
continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President assumes office.
[98] Whilst under the 1991 Constitution the limit on the tenure of the office of President was to start with the Constitution of 1991, that was changed in 1996 by Parliament. It determined that Article 35 of the Constitution was to have a retro-active effect. It meant that since the office of President was created in 1964 no person who had twice been elected to the office of President was eligible for re-election to that office. The intention was to limit the number of times one was elected to the office of President and not the period one held the office of President.

The Tenure of the Office of President under the Constitution as Amended in 2016
[99] Although the work done by the Mwanakatwe Constitution Commission did not result in a new constitutional it brought about a radical amendment of the Constitution. The work of the Mung’omba Constitution Commission and the Constitutional Conference that followed resulted in neither. The background material or travaux preparatoires most relevant to this case is that of the Technical Committee on the Drafting of the Zambian Constitution.
[100] The terms of reference of the Committee read:
The Technical Committee’s specific Terms of Reference are as follows:
(a) refer to Mvunga Constitution Review
(b) review the 1991 Constitution of Zambia, the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission Report and Draft Constitution, 1993, the Mung’omba Constitutional Review Commission Report and Draft Constitution, 2005, the Zaloumis Electoral Technical Report, 2005, and the NCC Report and Draft Constitution, 2010, in order to establish whether these –
i. reflect the values and aspirations of the people of Zambia;
ii. are relevant for the political, socio-economic, technological and scientific environment existing in Zambia; and
iii. establish a constitutional democracy and a culture of constitutionalism for Zambia; and
draft a National Constitution based on these objectives;

[101] The Committee was therefore required to consider the work of previous Constitution Commission in drafting the new Constitution for the Republic. Once appointed and relying on the work of previous Constitution Commissions the Committee came up with the first draft Constitution and the issue of the tenure of the office of President was addressed in Article 103, which read:
Tenure of Office
103. (1) The term of office for a President shall be five years.
(2) Subject to clauses (3) and (4), a President shall hold office for one term, commencing from the date the President-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the election results are announced, and shall be eligible to be elected as President for a second term.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution or any other law, a person who has twice been elected as President shall not be eligible for election as President.
(4) The President may, in writing, signed personally and addressed to the Speaker of the National Assembly, resign from office.
[102] This provision was not different from Article 35 of the CBA. In its final Report the Committee explained the rationale for Article 103 in the First Draft Constitution in these terms:
The rationale for the Article was that it was important to limit the number of terms to be served by a President in line with the current Constitution to avoid the tendency of an individual wanting to be in office in perpetuity. The Committee, therefore, resolved to retain the provision in the current Constitution. (Emphasis ours)

[103] There was no intention on the part of the Committee to change the constitutional position on the tenure of the office of President provided for in Article 35(2) of the CBA. The Committee’s intention was to continue the tradition of limiting the President to being elected twice to the office of President. There is nothing in the report to suggest that the Committee had a position different from what had been captured in Article 35 of the CBA. Article 103 of the First Draft Constitution reproduced above was complete. While Article 103 of the First Draft Constitution addressed the tenure of the office of President Article 102, addressed the assumption of the office of President by the President-elect. It read:
102. Assumption of office
(1) The President-elect shall assume office after being sworn in by the Chief Justice, or, in the absence of the Chief Justice, by the Deputy Chief Justice, as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(2) The President-elect shall be sworn into office on the Tuesday following –
(a) the fourteenth day after the date of the declaration of the election results, if no petition has been filed under Article
101(2) and in accordance with Article 101(3); or
(b) the seventh day following the date on which the court declares the election to be valid, if a petition has been filed under Article101(2).
(3) Subject to clause (4), where the President-elect dies or is for any other reason unable to assume office under Article 102, the Vice-President-elect shall assume the office of President in accordance with clause (1) and the handover process under Article 100(3) shall apply.
(4) Where the inability of the President-elect to assume office is as a result of an event or circumstance beyond the control of the President-elect, which has the effect of preventing the President-elect from being sworn into office, the Vice-President-elect shall not be sworn into office, unless the Constitutional Court determines that the inability of the President-elect to assume office is permanent.
(5) The Vice-President elect who assumes office as President, as a consequence of clause (3), shall appoint any person as Vice-President, subject to the approval of the National Assembly signified by a vote of not less than two thirds of the Members of Parliament.
(6) Where the Vice-President elect, who is supposed to assume the office of President as contemplated by clause (3), dies before assuming office –
(a) the Speaker shall assume the office of President; and
(b) a presidential election shall be held within ninety days of the vacancy occurring.
(7) Parliament shall enact legislation providing for the procedure and ceremony for the swearing-in of a President-elect or a person to whom clause (3) refers.

[104] Also relevant in understanding Article 106 of the CAA, is Article 107 of the draft Constitution. It provides for the Vice-President who is the running mate of the presidential candidate. It read:
107. Vice-President, election to office and swearing in
(1) There shall be a Vice-President for the Republic who shall be elected as a running mate to a presidential candidate.
(2) The qualifications and the disqualifications applying to a presidential candidate shall apply to the person selected by the presidential candidate as a running mate.
(3) An election to the office of Vice-President shall be conducted at the same time as that of an election to the office of President so that a vote cast for a presidential
candidate is a vote cast for the vice-presidential candidate, and if the presidential candidate is elected, the vice-presidential candidate is also elected.
(4) A Vice-President elect shall be sworn into office by the Chief Justice and shall assume office on the same day that the President-elect assumes office.
(5) Where a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice-President through death, resignation or removal from office on the same grounds and procedures as apply to the President, the President shall appoint another person to be Vice-President and the National Assembly shall, by a resolution supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament, approve the appointment of the Vice-President who shall serve for the unexpired term of office.
(6) The Vice-President shall not hold any other office of profit or which pays emoluments.
(7) The emoluments of the Vice-President shall be as determined by the Emoluments Commission and specified in an Act of Parliament, except that a person who served as Vice-President for part of a term shall be paid emoluments on a pro rata basis.
(8) The emoluments of the Vice-President shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund. (Emphasis ours)

[105] Whilst the draft Constitution addressed the election to the office of Vice-President and how the vacancy in that office was to be treated it was discovered by the Committee, during its deliberations and consultations, that the vacancy in the office of the President was not addressed and how the remainder of the tenure of the office of President was to be treated. The Committee considered the resolutions of the District Consultative Fora, Provincial, Sector Groups and National Conventions that considered the First Draft Constitution and noted in its Report:
Deliberations of the Technical Committee on Article 103
The Committee considered the resolutions of the District Consultative Fora, Provincial, Sector Groups and National Conventions.
The Committee amended the marginal note by adding the words “of President and vacancy” at the end in order to capture the essence of the Article which included vacation of office by resignation.
The Committee also amended the Article by providing for circumstances where a Vice-President or a new President serves an unexpired term of a President who does not complete his or her term of office. The Committee observed that it was important to make a provision as to whether or not the inherited term should be counted.
Further, the Committee amended the Article by adding a provision to spell out circumstances in which the office of President may become vacant.
Furthermore, the Committee agreed to amend the Article by stating how the term of office for a President should relate to the term of Parliament. The Committee observed that it would be logical to provide that the term of office for a President should run concurrently with the term of Parliament. (Emphasis ours)
[106] After the deliberations the Committee resolved:
Resolutions of the Technical Committee on Article 103
The Committee resolved to amend the Article by:
(a) changing the marginal note to read “Tenure of office of President and vacancy;
(b) adding a provision to clarify the position of a Vice-President or new President who serves an expired term of office for a President who does not complete his or her term;
(c) adding a provision on circumstances in which the office of President may become vacant;
(d) providing for the term of office of a President to run concurrently with the term of Parliament; and
(e) re-numbering the Article as Article 104. (Emphasis ours)

[107] Article 103 of the first draft Constitution was re-numbered in the final draft Constitution as Article 104. The new Article 104 of the draft Constitution comprised three paragraphs, which captured the essence of Article 35 of the CBA. It read:
104. [Tenure of office of President and vacancy]
(1) The term of office for a President is five years which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 105.
(2) A President shall hold office from the date the President-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn into office.
(3) A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as President.
[108] The Committee resolved that Article 104 should address additional issues: instances when the office of President was to be deemed vacant, what was to happen in that instance and how the remainder of the period after the vacancy had been filled was to be treated. Instances where the office of President would be deemed vacant was addressed in Article 104(4), which read:
(4) The office of President becomes vacant if the President —
(a) dies;
(b) resigns by notice in writing to the Speaker of the National Assembly; or
(c) otherwise ceases to hold office under Article 81,107 or 108.
[109] What was to happen in the event of a vacancy in the office of President was addressed in Article 104(5), which read:
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of President, except under Article 81 —
(a) the Vice-President shall immediately assume the office of President; or
(b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of President, the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to —
(i) make an appointment; or
(ii) dissolve the National Assembly;
and a presidential election shall be held within sixty days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
[110] Finally the Committee addressed how the remainder of the period served by the Vice-President as President following a vacancy in the office of President, was to be treated for purposes of limiting the number of times one was to hold the office of President as set out in Article 104(3) of the draft Constitution. This was addressed in Article 104(6), which read:
(6) If the Vice-President assumes the office of President, in accordance with clause (5)(a), or a person is elected to the office of President as a result of an election held in accordance with clause 5(b), the Vice-President or the President-elect shall serve for the unexpired term of office and be deemed, for the purposes of clause (3) —
(a) to have served a full term as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, at least three years remain before the date of the next general election; or
(b) not to have served a term of office as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, less than three years remain before the date of the next general election. (Emphasis ours)
[111] Based on the recommendations of the Committee the final version of Article 104 of the Constitution read:
[104. Tenure of office of President and vacancy]
(1) The term of office for a President is five years which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 103.
(2) A President shall hold office from the date the President-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn into office.
(3) A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as President.
(4) The office of President becomes vacant if the President –
(a) dies;
(b) resigns by notice in writing to the Speaker of the National Assembly; or
(c) otherwise ceases to hold office under Article 105, 106 or 138.
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of President, except under Article 138 –
(a) the Vice-President shall immediately assume the office of President; or
(b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of President, the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to–
(i) make an appointment; or
(ii) dissolve the National Assembly;
and a presidential election shall be held within sixty days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
(6) If the Vice-President assumes the office of President, in accordance with clause (5)(a), or a person is elected to the office of President as a result of an election held in accordance with clause 5(b), the Vice-President or the President-elect shall serve for the unexpired term of office and be deemed, for the purposes of clause (3) –
(a) to have served a full term as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, more than three years remain before the date of the next general election; or
(b) not to have served a term of office as President if, at the date on which the President assumed office, less than three years remain before the date of the next general election.

[112] When the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 17 of 2015, was formulated Article 104 of the Constitution was renumbered as Article 106 and when it was passed by Parliament it became Article 106 of the CAA. In devising Article 106(3) of the CAA the intention of the Committee was not reverse the effect of Article 35(2) of the CBA but to continue it. Both Articles 35(2) of the CBA and 106(3) of the CAA have the same effect: to limit the number of times one is eligible for nomination for election to the office of President. Having twice held the office of President no one, thereafter is eligible for nomination for election to the office of President.
[113] There is nothing in Article 106 of the CAA, or the report which indicates the Committee’s intention or desire to remove the limitation of the tenure of the office of President embodied in Article 35 of the CBA. The rationale of what became Article 106(1) to (3) of the CAA is to limit the number of terms to be served by a President in line with the Constitution as amended in 1996 to avoid the tendency of whoever is President wanting to be in office in perpetuity. The Committee, therefore, resolved to retain the provision in Article 35 of the CBA.
[114] There is nothing in Article 106 of the CAA that indicates the Committee’s intention to depart from the limitation on the tenure of the President contained in Article 35 of the CBA. The only difference between Article 35 of the CBA was the use of the use of the phrase “— person who has twice been elected as President —” while Article 106(3) of the CAA uses the phrase “— person who has twice held office as President—.” The change in the language can be attributed to the change in terms of how the vacancy in the office of the President was being treated between the CBA and the CAA. Under the CBA the Vice-President was not directly by the people. He was appointed by the President from among member of the National Assembly. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the President an election had to be held pursuant to Article 38 of the CBA for election of the person to occupy the office of the President for the remainder of the period until the next general election. Under the CBA no one could ascend to or occupy the office of President except through an election.

Conclusions and Prayer
[115] We submit that there is no provision in the CAA, which overrides or provides an exception to Article 106(3) of the CAA to enable the First Respondent to stand for election on 12th August 2021. In order to qualify for nomination for election to the office of President for the third time under the CAA the candidate must establish that:
(a) there was a vacancy in the office of President as defined in Article 106(4);
(b) since the last general election was held on 11th August 2016, the vacancy occurred after 11th August 2019;
(c) the person holding the office of Vice-President was unable to assume the office of President following the vacancy;
(d) the Speaker assumed the responsibility of performing the functions of the office of President;
(e) the election to fill up the vacancy in the office of President was held not later than 9th October 2019;
(f) the election of 2019 pursuant to Article 106(6) did not count for purposes of Article 106(3)
Once these conditions have been met the President elected in the October 2019 election would be eligible to stand for election for the second time on 12th August 2021 and for the third time August 2026.
We submit that given the language of Article 106 of the CAA there is no scenario or interpretation of the Constitution, that allows the First Respondent to be constitutionally nominated for election to the office of President for the third time. To affirm the First Respondent nomination for election to the office of President scheduled for 12th August 2021, will be an act of vandalism against the Constitution as it stands.

Relief Sought By The Petitioner
[116] We accordingly pray that this Court declares that:
(a) the Respondent having been elected, sworn into and held the office of President from 25th January 2015 to 13th September 2016, and having been declared winner of the 2016 election, sworn into and having held the office of President from 13th of September 2016, until the next President is elected under the 2021 election is not eligible for nomination for election as President in the election set for 12th of August 2021; and
(b) to the extent that the Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President scheduled for 12th August 2021, contravenes Article 106(3) of the Constitution, the said nomination is null and void; and
[117] The Petitioner pray for an Order (of Certiorari) that the nomination paper filed by the Respondent with the Returning Officer and all documents in support of the Respondent’s nomination for election to the office of President in the election of 12th August 2021, be removed forthwith into the Constitutional Court for purposes of quashing.
We accordingly pray

Editor’s Note: This written submission was filed on behalf of the Sishuwa Sishuwa and Chapter One Foundation on 2 June 2021.